Abstract-Helper data schemes are a security primitive used for privacy-preserving biometric databases and physical unclonable functions. One of the oldest known helper data schemes is the code offset method (COM). We propose an extension of the COM: the helper data are accompanied by many instances of fake helper data that are drawn from the same distribution as the real one. While the adversary has no way to distinguish between them, the legitimate party has more information and can see the difference. We use a low-density parity check code in order to improve the efficiency of the legitimate party's selection procedure. Our construction provides a new kind of tradeoff: more effective use of the source entropy, at the price of increased helper data storage. We give a security analysis in terms of Shannon entropy and order-2 Rényi entropy. We also propose a variant of our scheme in which the helper data list is not stored but pseudorandomly generated, changing the tradeoff to source entropy utilization versus computation effort.
I. INTRODUCTION

A. Helper Data Systems
The past decade has seen a lot of interest in a field that can be characterized as 'security with noisy data'. In several security applications it is necessary to reproducibly extract secret data from noisy measurements on a physical system.
One such application is the privacy-preserving storage of biometric data. Analogously to password hashing, one can store biometric data in hashed form in order to prevent inside attackers from learning what the enrolled biometric features look like. Another application is read-proof storage of cryptographic keys using Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) [6] , [22] , [26] , [28] , [29] .
Storage of keys in nonvolatile digital memory can often be considered insecure because of the vulnerability to physical attacks. (For instance, fuses can be optically inspected with a microscope; flash memory may be removed and read out.) PUFs provide an alternative way to store keys, namely in analog form, which allows the designer to exploit the inscrutability of analog physical behavior. Keys stored in this way are sometimes referred to as Physically Obfuscated Keys (POKs) [16] .
In both the biometrics and the PUF/POK application, one faces the problem that some form of error correction has to be performed, but under the constraint that the redundancy data, which is considered to be visible to attackers, does not endanger the secret extracted from the physical measurement. This problem is solved by a special security primitive, the Helper Data System (HDS).
A HDS in its most general form is shown in Fig. 1 . The Enroll procedure takes as arguments a measurement X and (optionally) a random value R. It outputs a secret S and Helper Data W . The helper data is stored. In the reconstruction phase, a fresh measurement X is obtained. Typically X is a noisy version of X, close to X (in terms of e.g. Euclidean distance or Hamming distance) but not necessarily identical. The Rec (reconstruction) procedure takes X and W as input. It outputsŜ, an estimate of S. If X is not too noisy thenŜ = S.
Two special cases of the general HDS are the Secure Sketch (SS) and the Fuzzy Extractor (FE) [12] .
• The Secure Sketch has S = X (andŜ =X, an estimator for X). If X is not uniformly distributed, then S is not uniform. The SS is suitable for privacy-preserving biometrics, where high entropy of S (given W ) is required, but not uniformity.
• The Fuzzy Extractor has a (nearly) uniform S given W .
The FE is typically used for extracting keys from PUFs and POKs. There exists a generic construction to create a FE out of a SS: hashing the output of the SS using a Universal Hash Function (UHF) [8] , [20] , [27] .
B. The Code Offset Method
One of the oldest known SS constructions is the Code Offset Method (COM) [12] , [19] . Here X is a binary string, say of length n, with probability distribution ρ. The construction uses a linear error-correcting code that encodes k-bit messages as n-bit codewords. The encoding and decoding operations are denoted as Enc and Dec respectively. The COM takes R uniformly drawn from {0, 1} k and W = X ⊕ Enc(R) ;Ŝ =X = W ⊕ Enc(Dec(W ⊕ X )). (1) This is depicted in Fig. 2 . If X is uniformly distributed on {0, 1} n then the scheme is not only a SS but in fact also a FE; this holds because a uniform X gives rise to helper data W that leaks nothing about R. The formulas for the FE are: S = R and W = X ⊕ Enc(R);Ŝ =R = Dec(X ⊕ W ). Remark: The COM would work equally well if W were to point from X to the codeword closest to X instead of pointing to a random codeword. However, finding the nearest codeword for an arbitrary string is generally a difficult problem. Thus, the role of the auxiliary variable R in the COM is merely to circumvent this problem.
Note that for uniform X the W reveals the syndrome of X, but nothing about R. Hence R can then be used as a cryptographic key. In this paper we study non-uniform X. A non-uniform X appears naturally, e.g. in the case of Coating PUFs [28] , where Gray-coded capacitance measurements are concatenated to form X. Typically not all Gray code words are represented, which leads to non-uniformity.
Similarly, a biometric feature vector is often split up into near-independent components which each yield a small number of non-uniform bits.
C. Zero Leakage
For some sources X it is possible to define helper data that reveals nothing about S. This is sometimes called Zero Secrecy Leakage (ZSL) helper data. The information contained in X is split into two independent parts, one of which serves for error correction, and one for constructing the secret S.
As we saw above, the COM with uniform X has the ZSL property. Another example is the quantile partitioning scheme [31] of Verbitskiy et al. for continuous X, and its generalization to non-uniform S [10] .
D. Contributions and Outline
In this paper we propose a simple modification of the Code Offset Method Secure Sketch. The basic idea is to hide the helper data amid a number (say m − 1) of dummy helper data instances. All the instances are a priori indistinguishable from the point of view of the adversary, The legitimate party, on the other hand, possesses X , which allows for efficiently finding the correct helper data instance. This workload asymmetry improves the security. For small m, the attacker may simply try out all possibilities, which leads to an average attack effort of (m + 1)/2 times the original effort. For very large m this brute force attack is no longer feasible, and the attacker is forced to ignore the public data; in this way a new kind of 'zero leakage' is achieved, distinct from the ZSL of Section I-C, namely public data that reveals practically nothing about X (as opposed to zero leakage about S).
The concept of 'spamming' the attacker in this way is very general and is applicable whenever there exists an efficient way of recognizing the correct W using X . In this paper we show how the 'spamming' concept can be applied to the Code Offset Method. Our scheme requires the use of a linear error-correcting code with low-density parity check matrix (LDPC) in order to keep the legitimate party's workload low.
In Section II we introduce notation and assumptions. In Section III we discuss a version of the COM that does not need the auxiliary variable R. We call it the Syndrome-Only COM. We analyze its leakage and briefly review the Leftover Hash Lemma. In Section IV we present an informationtheoretic analysis of the generic principle of adding fake data. In Section V we present our new scheme, which we call the Spammed Code Offset Method (SCOM). Section VI contains a security analysis of the SCOM. Memory requirements and search efficiency are discussed in Section VII. In Section VIII we present a modified version of the SCOM where all the helper data is generated by a pseudo-random number generator instead of being retrieved from storage. We call this version GSCOM (Generative SCOM). A discussion and conclusions are given in Section IX.
II. NOTATION AND ATTACKER MODEL
Random variables are written with capitals, and their realizations in lower case. Vectors are in boldface; sets in calligraphic font. Concatenation is denoted as ||. The notation d H (x, y) stands for the Hamming distance between x and y. The logarithm 'log' has base 2. The natural logarithm is ln. The unit vector e j consists of all zeros, except for a '1' in position j . The Kronecker delta is written as δ x,y .
The Code Offset Method works with a linear code C that has n-bit code words and k-bit messages. The encoding and decoding algorithms associated with this code are denoted as Enc: {0, 1} k → {0, 1} n and Dec: {0, 1} n → {0, 1} k respectively. The algorithm for computing the syndrome is denoted as Syn: {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n−k . If the decoder is a syndrome decoder, then the mapping from a syndrome to a minimal error pattern is called SDec:
We consider a source (biometric/POK) whose output at enrollment is a bit string X ∈ {0, 1} n . The string R in Fig. 2 has length k. The helper data is called W . In the FE setting, the cryptographic key that is ultimately derived is denoted as Q ∈ {0, 1} .
We will use shorthand notation
The public data stored in nonvolatile memory is P.
The outcome of the measurement in the reconstruction phase is denoted as X ∈ {0, 1} n . The X is a noisy version of X, and in general does not have the same probability distribution as X. The estimator for the key Q, derived from X and the public data, is denoted asQ.
We will rely on a cryptographic hash function f . Furthermore we will use a Universal Hash Function g(x, a) , where the second argument is public auxiliary randomness.
The Shannon entropy of a random variable X is written as H(X). Conditional Shannon entropy is denoted as H(X|Y ). The mutual information between X and Y is written
The attacker model is summarized as follows. We distinguish between two scenarios: 1) Biometric database for authentication. The adversary can read but not manipulate the public data P. His aim is to learn as much about X as he can. 1 2) Secure key storage with a POK.
The adversary has access to the device which contains the POK. He cannot re-activate the device's enrollment mode of operation. The opacity of the POK, and the embedding of the POK in the device, prevent the adversary from reading out Q from the POK. Furthermore, physical tampering with the POK is unerringly detected by the device at the reconstruction phase. The public data P is stored on the device in insecure nonvolatile memory. The adversary is able to read and to manipulate P. There is no Public Key Infrastructure that would allow the device to verify the authenticity of the public data. The adversary's main aim is to learn the POK key Q. A secondary goal is to cause the device to accept a key other than Q as the correct key. In both scenarios the adversary is able to discern whether reconstruction is successful. He also observes the running time of the reconstruction algorithm. We assume that no other side channels exist.
III. THE SYNDROME-ONLY CODE OFFSET METHOD
A. Construction
As was mentioned in Section I, the only role of the auxiliary variable R in the COM is to avoid the difficult problem of finding the codeword closest to X. Here we present an alternative way of avoiding this problem. This construction does not need auxiliary random variables, and thereby significantly simplifies security analyses (see Sections III-B, IV and VI). We present two versions: (1) A version that requires a syndrome decoder SDec. See e.g. construction 3 in [11] . (2) A version without such a requirement. Instead, it makes use of a lookup table that allows arbitrary syndromes to be mapped to n-bit words in a deterministic way.
Version 2 needs a separate Setup phase. The two versions have the same enrollment algorithm, but their reconstruction algorithms differ. We start by presenting version 1. (The abbreviation SO stands for 'Syndrome-Only'.)
Abort with failure ifĥ = h .
We note the following,
• The size of the helper data W is only n − k bits, as compared to the n bits in the original COM.
• Steps 3 and 4 of SO1.Reconstruct make use of the linearity of the syndrome:
. This makes it possible to perform the steps prior to decoding without leaving the 'syndrome space' {0, 1} n−k .
• This construction is compatible with the 'reverse fuzzy extractor' protocol proposed in [30] , and similar protocols where the decoding step is outsourced.
• At reconstruction the public data may have been (maliciously) altered, which is why we use the notation P , W , ζ , h in step 1 of algorithm SO1.Reconstruct.
• In step 3 of SO1.Enroll, X is hashed together with the helper data. This way of protecting the helper data against manipulation was introduced by [7] . Alternatively, one may use a Message Authentication Code with Key Manipulation Security [9] .
• In SO2.Setup, finding values L j is not difficult. It requires having the pseudo-inverse of the parity check matrix. It does not require solving the nearest-codeword problem.
• In SO2.Setup, the choice of L j is arbitrary, in the same way that the R in the original COM is arbitrary.
• The size of the table L is merely (n − k) × n bits.
• In step 3 of SO2.Reconstruct, the sum j is understood to be defined as bitwise XOR.
• L is public. Hence, in case SO2.Reconstruct is implemented on a severely resource-constrained device that cannot store L, the table lookup and the computation of j W j L j can be outsourced.
• The V in step 3 of SO2.Reconstruct is the analogue of X ⊕ W in the ordinary COM. The V contains a lot of information about X, so it must not be revealed to other parties. The decoding of V can be outsourced only if V is masked first.
• The Dec can be any decoder algorithm.
• An alternative (and security-wise equivalent) enrollment procedure would be to store j (Syn X) j L j ∈ {0, 1} n instead of Syn X as helper data. That would constitute a deterministic version of the helper data X ⊕ Enc R in the original COM. All the random choices have been shifted to the creation of the lookup table in the setup phase, where they are 'frozen' as system parameters.
B. Analysis of the Syndrome-Only COM
The lack of auxiliary variables makes our scheme simpler to analyze than the original COM. We consider the general case of a source variable X that is not necessarily uniform.
As mentioned in Section II, the probability Pr[X = x] is denoted as p x and Pr[Syn X = y] as q y . Thus we have
Lemma 1: In the Syndrome-Only COM we have the following probabilities:
Proof: The p w|x follows trivially from the fact that W = Syn X. Multiplication by p x yields p xw . Finally p x|w is equal to p xw /q w . Lemma 2: In the Syndrome-Only COM it holds that
Proof: The first two equations immediately follow from W = Syn X. In the last line we write
We briefly discuss the required amount of compression in case one wants to build a Fuzzy Extractor from the Secure Sketch. In order to obtain a nearly uniform key Q from X, one has to hash down to a smaller size (say ): Q = g(X, A) ∈ {0, 1} . Here A is public auxiliary randomness that serves as a 'catalyst' for the UHF g.
Let U be a uniform variable on {0, 1} . The relation between and the uniformity of Q is given by the Leftover Hash Lemma (LHL) [17] and can be formulated as
Eq. (2) states that the non-uniformity of Q given W does not exceed ε as long as X has been sufficiently hashed down. The must not exceed the 'ε-extractable randomness' L ε . The notation H 2 in (3) stands for the conditional Rényi entropy of order two and is defined as [13] H 2 (X|W ) = −2 log T 2 (X|W )
where E w stands for the expectation value over W . Note that the 'penalty' term 2 log 1 ε in (3) depends only on ε, i.e. it depends not on the improvement of the uniformity but on the final uniformity. Because of this fact, the approach using UHFs can be quite wasteful.
Remark: Under some conditions [4] the factor 2 in the penalty term can be replaced by 1. Furthermore, the LHL can be sharpened somewhat by considering smooth Rényi entropy [23] , [24] , [32] . Such details are beyond the scope of the current paper.
IV. ADDING FAKE HELPER DATA; GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
The concept of hiding data in a large amount of fake data is very old. However, the application of this principle to helper data is, to the best of our knowledge, new. be i.i.d. generated fake helper data instances (independent of W ), where m ≥ 1, and where it is not necessarily the case that the probability distribution of the fake helper data is the same as for the true helper data. Let Z ∈ {1, . . . , m} be a random variable, not necessarily uniform. Let be a vector constructed from the real and the fake helper data as
If W is a function of X only, then
Proof: We apply the chain rule to the expression H(X W | ) in two different ways and obtain 
If Z is drawn uniformly, and the fake helper data have the same distribution as W , then
Proof: Using the chain rule we have
, which is precisely (7). Next, if the variables W fake j are distributed precisely like W , then reveals no information about Z , i.e. I (Z ; ) = 0. Finally, if Z is uniform on {1, . . . , m} then H(Z ) = log m.
Note that there are two clearly interpretable penalty terms in (7). The 'collision penalty' H(Z |W ) increases with m. It becomes non-negligible when contains so many entries that it becomes likely that there exist entries with the same value 2 ; then even knowing W and does not fix Z .
The 'distribution mismatch penalty' occurs when the fake entries in do not look statistically the same as W ; then some information about Z can be obtained already from inspecting .
At first sight (6) might seem to contradict the well known principle 'conditioning reduces Shannon entropy'. However, it should be borne in mind that is not just W plus decoys; results from a Z -dependent function applied to W and the decoys. This function reduces the leakage from W . Lemmas 3 and 4 will be used for the analysis of the Spammed COM in Section VI-A. Lemma 5: Let the helper data W be a function of X only. Let Z and be defined as in Lemma 3. Let W fake denote an arbitrary fake entry in . Let
Proof: See Appendix A. Note: if Z is uniform then z π 2 z = 1/m.
V. THE SPAMMED CODE OFFSET METHOD We first show a naive spamming approach, without efficient de-spamming at the reconstruction phase. Then we propose an efficient scheme, in two variants: one in the privacy-preserving biometrics context, the other in the secure key storage context. The efficient scheme requires a linear block code with a lowdensity parity check (LDPC) matrix [15] . (For background on LDPC codes see e.g. [14] and [25] .)
We present our SCOM schemes as being derived from the scheme SO1, for reasons of simplicity and brevity. However, SO2 can be chosen as the underlying scheme instead. The security and the storage requirements are analyzed in Section VI.
A. Naive Approach
It is crucial that the adversary cannot 'see inside' the hash G. Note that in step 6 of the enrollment, the hash is computed over the entire vector . This ensures that any manipulation of the public data will be detected, be it in the hash, in W or in the decoys. Note that the fake helper data also play the role of salt.
In step 3 of the enrollment, an alternative would be to draw a fake X fake j from the distribution of X and then compute W j = Syn X fake j . At reconstruction the public data may have been altered, which is why we use the notation P , , G in step 1 of the reconstruction. A list L 1 is made of entries that lead to successful decoding. The whole set L 1 has to be taken into account, since some of the decoys may by chance decode, and the order of the entries is random. The list of candidates is further narrowed down to a list L 2 of entries whoseX j generates the correct hash. If P = P and X ≈ X then typically there is only one candidate left in L 2 . If P = P or X is too noisy to be error-corrected, then typically L 2 = ∅.
The main idea behind the scheme is that the adversary cannot distinguish between the true helper data and the decoys. The legitimate party, on the other hand, knows X , which allows it to make the distinction.
It may happen that the choice of system parameters is such that NaiveSCOM.Reconstruct has a long running time.
Step 4 contains m decodings, and |L 1 | hashes are computed in step 6. The choice of n, k, and m may give rise to a long list L 1 . In the schemes below we aim to reduce the running time of the reconstruction algorithm.
Note that the running time may reveal the length of L 1 , and possibly of L 2 . We do not consider this to be a security leak, since the |L 1 | and |L 2 | reveal only the amount of noise in X .
B. Secure Sketch for Biometrics Database
Below we show a more efficient pair of algorithms (BioSCOM.Enroll, BioSCOM.Verify) in the biometric verification scenario. The idea behind this scheme is that comparing Syn X to Syn X and the other syndromes allows the device to heuristically re-order in such a way that the most likely candidates are tried first. Here it is crucial that the parity check matrix of the code has low density: then a small Hamming distance between X and X leads to a small Hamming distance between Syn X and Syn X . If the decoding fails then goto 8.
Remark: There are many alternative ways to organize the verification. For instance, in step 6 the vector does not have to be physically permuted; permutation of the indices {1, . . . , m} is more efficient. Also, steps 4 and 5 can be combined to efficiently create an ordered list while computing the Hamming distances.
The computational workload of BioSCOM.Verify consists of: m Hamming distance computations; sorting of (time ∝ m if steps 4 and 5 are combined, e.g. with an algorithm resembling Bucket Sort); a number of decodings and hashes that depends on the amount of noise in X . Note that the timing side channel reveals only the amount of noise.
We propose that an LDPC code is used with column weight 3, i.e. three nonzero entries in each column of the parity check matrix. On the one hand, this allows for good error correction capabilities. On the other hand, one bit flip in X causes only 3 bit flips in Syn X. Let us model the noise in X as a binary symmetric channel with bit error rate (BER) β. Then, roughly speaking, 3 
is binomial-distributed with expectation 3nβ and standard deviation 3 √ nβ(1 − β). A W fake can be roughly modeled as a random string of length n − k. Its Hamming distance to Syn X is binomialdistributed with expectation (n − k)/2 and standard deviation 
C. Fuzzy Extractor
Below we present a pair of algorithms (FESCOM.Enroll, FESCOM.Reconstruct) for use as a Fuzzy Extractor in the POK scenario. This is a minor modification of (NaiveSCOM.Enroll, BioSCOM.Verify); the only difference is the derivation of a key Q from X and auxiliary public randomness A, with the use of the extractor function g. 3 We ignore collisions. The given expressions are upper bounds. P = ( , A, G) .
If the decoding fails then goto 8.
VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF THE SCOM
We investigate how much information about X is revealed to the adversary by showing him . In principle we should be looking at the leakage from the whole public data P, but there one hits a snag: information-theoretically there is no such thing as a one-way function. The hash G hides its input in practice, but information-theoretically speaking G reveals Z and W to the adversary. The leakage from is a better way to represent the adversary's actual workload than the leakage from and G. In effect, we will model the hash function as if it is perfectly hiding.
In the biometrics scenario, the relevant quantity to look at is Shannon entropy. (One might argue that min-entropy is more important, but since we do not have the stringent requirements that cryptographic keys have to satisfy, 4 we will stick to Shannon entropy.) The relevant quantity in the POK scenario is the Rényi entropy H 2 , which features in the ε-extractable randomness (3). We show results for both scenarios. In Section VII we investigate memory requirements.
A. Leakage in Terms of Shannon Entropy
We first present a lemma that allows us to relate the leakage I (X; ) to the collisions in . 
Proof: We start from Lemmas 3 and 4, which together give H(X| ) = H(X|W ) + log m − H(Z |W ). Next we write H(Z |W ) = E wω H(Z |W = w, = ω). The uncertainty about Z given W = w and = ω is caused by the fact that there can be multiple occurrences of the string w ∈ {0, 1} n−k in ω; the number of occurrences is t (w, ω), and each of them is equally probable from the attacker's point of view. Hence H(Z |W = w, = ω) = log t (w, ω). Theorem 1: Consider the algorithm BioSCOM.Enroll or FESCOM.Enroll. The conditional entropy H(X| ) can be bounded from below as
Proof: We start from Lemma 6. We write t (w, ω) = 1 + u(w, ω) and use ln(1 + u) ≤ u. This gives E wω log t (w, ω) ≤ The probability q w is typically of the order 1/2 n−k if X is not too strangely distributed. Hence the last term in (10) 
Proof: As in the proof of Theorem 1, we write t = 1 + u. Furthermore we split u into its expectation value (at fixed w) and a deviation: u = (m − 1)q w + δ, where E δ δ = 0. Then
Next we use ln(1 + z) ≤ z twice, and E δ δ = 0, to get
We substitute (13) into Lemma 6 and use H(X|W ) + H(W ) = H(X). In the limit m > 2 n−k , the 1 m term in Theorem 2 is a small correction term; we see that then hardly leaks anything about X, as we would expect intuitively, since is likely to contain almost all possible strings of length n − k.
B. Leakage in Terms of Rényi Entropy
We present a bound on H 2 (X| ) that is useful for large m. We observe that for the adversary each entry in ω is equally likely to be the correct one. Thus, his knowledge about x can be parametrized as a probability distribution that is conditioned on each of the entries ω j with equal probability 1/m. (Remember that the fake helper data are drawn from the same distribution as Syn X). This gives
Based on (14) we obtain the following result. Theorem 3: Consider the algorithm BioSCOM.Enroll or FE-SCOM.Enroll. The conditional Rényi entropy H 2 (X| ) can be bounded from below as
Proof:
In (17) we used Jensen's inequality. In (18) we substituted (14) . Finally (15) When spammed helper data is used instead of W , the entropy H 2 (X|W ) in the extractable randomness formula (3) can be replaced by the (much) larger number H 2 (X| ).
VII. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
In the biometrics scenario, a large amount of storage space is available per enrolled person, since the public data P is usually stored in a dedicated database. Blowing up the database by a large factor could be feasible. Furthermore, the original W is a short string to start with.
In the POK scenario, the public data is usually stored on the device that contains the POK. This device has to be cheap; hence nonvolatile memory may become an issue.
In the examples below we consider a Binary Symmetric Channel (BSC) with bit error rate (BER) β. Example 1. Consider a uniform biometric X with n = 127 and β = 2.2%. (Such a low BER can be obtained by preprocessing, e.g. reliable component selection). We look at the NaiveSCOM scheme employing a BCH code (n, k, t) = (127, 50, 13), i.e. the code can correct 13 errors, which at the given BER corresponds to a decoding error probability of less than 10 −6 . For m = 1 the security is H(X| ) = k = 50 bits. In order to gain δ bits of security we need m ≈ 2 δ+1 , which requires a storage space of 2 δ+1 (n − k) bits = 2 δ−5.7 kilobytes. One MB available per enrolled user would allow for δ = 15.7. Efficient syndrome decoders exist for BCH codes [11] .
Example 2: POK storing a symmetric key. Consider a non-uniform X with n = 816 and β = 4.0%, whose distribution is such that Syn X is approximately uniform. We look at the FESCOM scheme employing an LDPC code with the following parameters [21] : column weight 3; rate 1/2 (k = 408). The decoding error probability 5 is around 10 −5 .
In order to achieve δ extra bits of security, the required storage is 2 δ+1 (n − k) bits ≈ 2 δ−3.3 kilobytes.
The column weight of the parity check matrix is 3, which means that each bit flip in X causes 3 bit flips in Syn X .
The expected number of bit flips in X is 32.6, with a standard deviation of 5.6, which translates to less than 97.8 and 16.8 respectively in Syn X .
The Hamming distance between Syn X (or Syn X ) and a randomly generated 408-bit string, on the other hand, is on average 204 bits with a standard deviation of 10.1. We may consider using a threshold of ≈ 161 bit flips in the syndrome to distinguish between the real helper data and the fakes. The probability Pr[d H (Syn X , Syn X) > 161] is less than 1.6 · 10 −4 , while the probability that a random 408-bit string is removed from Syn X (or Syn X ) by fewer than 161 bit flips is 1 · 10 −5 . Hence, in this example a false reject rate better than 1.6 · 10 −4 is achieved (independent of m), and if there is no false reject then the correct helper data clearly stands out to the legitimate user even if has of order 10 5 entries.
Example 3: POK storing an RSA prime. Similar to Example 2. n = 8000; k = 4000; β = 5.4%; storage 2 δ−0.03 kilobytes. 6 The number of bit flips in Syn X has average ≤1296 and standard deviation ≤ 60.6, whereas a random 4000-bit string has average Hamming distance 2000 with standard deviation 31.6. We have Pr[d H (random string, Syn X) ≤ 1850] = 1 · 10 −6 and Pr[d H (Syn X , Syn X) > 1590] ≤ 1 · 10 −6 , again a low false reject rate as well as a clear separation between the real entry and the fake ones. 5 In the literature on LDPC codes, the performance is often given for the Additive White Gaussian Noise channel. For this channel, soft information is available, and up to 6% BER can be tolerated with the given decoding failure probability of 10 −5 . We translate this (somewhat loosely) to β = 4.0% on the BSC. 6 Not counting the storage of a mask which is needed to convert the hashed X to a prime. This is independent of m.
VIII. GENERATIVE SCOM
The list can grow very large if one wishes to reduce a significant part of the leakage I (W ; X). Below we present a method for generating on the fly. This changes the security ↔ storage tradeoff into a security ↔ processing tradeoff. Given the existence of Pseudo-Random Number Generators (PRNGs) that output more than one byte per clock cycle [1] , [2] , it can be faster to generate than to fetch it from nonvolatile memory.
A. Construction
The construction relies on a fast PRNG γ that generates (n − k)-bit strings, given a seed S. The i 'th string derived from S is denoted as γ i (S) ∈ {0, 1} n−k . The verification algorithm uses thresholds θ 0 , . . . , θ N on the Hamming distance to distinguish between likely candidates (small d H ) and unlikely candidates (large d H ). Unlikely candidates are postponed. The thresholds satisfy θ 0 = 0 and θ 0 < θ 1 < · · · < θ N . The length m is considered to be a fixed system parameter.
If the decoding fails then Next i .
Auth=False then Next r . 9) Return Auth.
• In GenSCOM.Verify, the mask B is added to Syn X in step 4 for efficiency reasons. (The alternative would be to add the mask inside the i -loop.) • The full i -loop is completed even after the correct entry is found. This is done in order to thwart timing side channel attacks. The timing reveals only the number of completed r -rounds, and the total number of decodings and hashings of fake entries; i.e. the amount of noise is revealed.
• We have shown only the scheme for the biometrics scenario. It can be trivially adapted to the POK scenario.
• The distribution of d H (W fake , Syn X ) is practically the same as the distribution of d H (W fake , Syn X) as discussed in Section V-B. Hence the same analysis applies.
B. Security Analysis of GenSCOM
In the GenSCOM scheme, the role of the list is taken by the generated sequence 
Proof: We start from Lemma 7 and use Lemma 4, replacing → gen . We have H(Z ) = log m. For the collision penalty we get H(Z |W gen ) = E wω log(1 + u) ≤ E wω u/ ln 2 just as in the proof of Theorem 1. Now, however, the entries are uniformly generated instead of having distribution q w . This gives E wω u = (m − 1)/2 n−k . Finally, for the distrib- 
C. GenSCOM Alternatives
If we are unlucky, GenSCOM.Verify makes multiple passes through the whole list . As an alternative algorithm, one could temporarily store unlikely candidates before trying them. A greedy algorithm would work e.g. as follows:
1) Store candidates whose Hamming weight is lower than a threshold, in ascending order, until the buffer is full. 2) For the most promising candidate, do the decoding and, if applicable, the hashing step. If the candidate fails then go back to 1. It is possible to reduce the running time while still retaining resistance against the timing side channel: The order in which the entries are generated by the PRNG may be randomized to some extent. Then it is no longer necessary to complete the full i -loop. This approach requires storing multiple seeds. Note that all the SCOM algorithms are easy to parallelize.
IX. DISCUSSION/RELATED WORK
We have proposed the Spammed Code Offset Method, in which the adversary gets spammed with bogus helper data. For small spam factor m, the security is increased by roughly log m bits. While the workload of the adversary is increased by a factor m/2, the workload of the legitimate party stays manageable: only few decodings and hashings are needed. This is achieved by using Hamming distance in syndrome space as a fast candidate selection criterion, where the use of an LDPC code makes sure that a small distance between X and X translates to a small distance in syndrome space; in case of an LDPC code with column weight 3, there are no more than 3 bit flips in Syn X per bit flip in X.
The SCOM works best if the fake helper data has the same distribution as the real one. Compared to other helper data schemes, this requires more precise knowledge of the source X. If the distributions are not the same, then the entropy of W suffers a distribution mismatch penalty I (Z ; ) (Lemma 4).
The SCOM provides a new kind of trade-off: a more effective use of source entropy is achieved at the price of storage or computation effort at reconstruction. This is especially interesting in applications where the source entropy is limited.
In the POK scenario it depends on various system parameters whether it makes sense to use the SCOM. If the available storage/CPU resources in the device are limited and there is ample entropy in X, then the ordinary COM suffices.
In the biometrics case it is especially important to eliminate the leakage I (X; W ), since the entropy of X is usually rather low and has to be maximally exploited. Fortunately it is easier to meet the memory requirements in this scenario.
The timing side channel does not leak information about the location Z . NaiveSCOM.Reconstruct parses the whole list; In BioSCOM, FESCOM and GenSCOM the timing reveals only the amount of noise in X .
The idea of adding fake entries is not new in the context of noisy data, but to the best of our knowledge we are the first to apply it in helper data space. In [5] fake fingerprint minutiae are added to the stored template. A comparison in plaintext decides if a fresh fingerprint matches a sufficient number of stored minutiae. The 'Fuzzy Vault' scheme [18] adds a large amount of 'chaff' points to (e.g. biometric) data points contained in X. Our scheme differs significantly in two ways: (i) The amount of chaff in the Fuzzy Vault is necessarily large and does not allow for a security vs. storage trade-off at small amounts of storage; (ii) The Fuzzy Vault simultaneously hides the measurement X and a secret key.
The use of LDPC codes in the context of biometrics is not new. They have good error-correcting properties and easy to implement decoders. Furthermore, the belief propagation in the decoder lends itself to handling input bits of unequal reliability [33] . LDPC codes have also been proposed as a noise-tolerant hash function [3] . To the best of our knowledge, the SCOM is the first scheme that uses an LDPC code to filter out decoy entries.
As future work we mention experiments with various LDPC codes. Another interesting issue to look at is the crosslinkability between biometric templates in different databases. We remark that the process of recognizing which part of the data is 'real' is closely related to biometric identification: the fakes can be thought of as the biometrics of other people. When m is large, it becomes much harder for an adversary to decide if templates in different databases belong to the same person, since the decoys are likely to cause false matches. (26) we used Jensen's inequality to write log E a ≤ E a log. In (27) we wrote out E ω , using the fact that only the components ω z and ω a are relevant, and that ω z is the actual helper data W while ω a is fake. In (28) we used the definition of the KL distance.
